ABSTRACT
Introduction
High fertility has been pointed out as a major obstacle to improving human capital in developing countries, such as African and southern Asian countries. For example, the World Bank (1994) emphasizes the importance of population policy for poverty reduction and economic growth. The underlying reasoning is very straightforward from the perspective of endogenous economic growth models; the quality of labor force is essential for economic development and, given the scarcity of resource, we can educate each worker better when there are fewer.
The so-called "trade-off between child quantity and quality" is an empirical regularity on cross-country data. We can also observe the trade-off at the household level. Most of sociological studies succeed in finding that sibling size exerts a negative effect on each child's educational attainments such as grade completion and test scores, after controlling for parents' socioeconomic 2 status. For example, Blake (1989) finds across various samples what is called the "dilution effect"; more siblings dilutes a child's allocation of parental resources. 1 Economists, however, cast doubt on the empirical regularity in that child quantity and quality should be simultaneously determined by parents.
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The observed relationship may be spurious (perhaps exaggerated) due to unobserved heterogeneity across households. One source of heterogeneity is that households differ in their preferences for child quality. Those with relatively stronger preferences for child quality would have less children to educate each better rather than have many mediocre ones. As a result, an inverse association is observed, but it simply reflects different preferences across households. To avoid the simultaneity bias, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1987) exploit exogenous variation in fertility due to twinning.
In this study I attempt to estimate consistently the trade-off between child quantity and quality for the sample of South Korean households. South Korea must provide an interesting context in which to examine the current issue. As one of "Asian Tigers," it has been a showcase for developing countries as a fast track to economic development. As 1 Interestingly, Gomes (1984) finds for the sample of Kenya that children from larger family are more likely to complete grades, because parents in Kenya control their eldest child's earnings and younger children are benefited from this extra source of family resource. This clearly shows that we need to understand the underlying intrahousehold resource allocation mechanism to find the causal effect of sibling size on children's educational outcomes. 2 On the other hand, economists have tried to develop theoretical explanations for its existence. The major novelty here is that, even without assuming unusual substitutability between child quantity and quality in preferences, the trade-off may exist due to their interaction in budget constraint (Becker 1961, Becker and Willis 1971).
seen in figure 1 , one might argue that a major factor behind its economic success should be population policy. family norms. The basic question here is how much the decreases in fertility due to these policies can explain the increases in educational investment and, eventually, the economic growth. It is essential to know, rather than recognize a simple correlation, the extent to which high fertility rate adversely affects investment in children's education at the micro level.
There are two primary contributions of this study. First, I use parents' monetary investment in children's education as a quantitative measure of child quality, rather than use such variables as children's schooling, test scores, or earnings, which previous studies have used.
It should be a good measure of child quality because it is an important input for educational production. Also, it is more relevant to the economic theory of the trade-off between child quantity and quality. The theory is about parents' choices. It is therefore more appropriate to examine directly parental decisions rather than outcomes. The previous measures (for example, grade completion or earnings) are the outcome variables, which are realized far after parents decide child quantity. They are likely to be tainted with various noisy factors that change child quality but have nothing to do with parents' choice or intention. To test for the theory of the trade-off, it seems more reasonable to examine parents' decisions about child quality at the moment that they decide child quantity. 2 First Child's Sex as the Instrument for Fertility
Fertility-Stopping Rule
The first child's sex is strongly correlated with the actual number of children in the household.
According to the demography literature, there exists a specific fertility-stopping rule under son preferences; parity progression depends not only on the gap between desired and current number of total children, but also on the gap between parents' preferred and present number 3 The empirical strategy of this study is motivated by Iacovou (1996) and Angrist and Evans (1998). They exploit preferences for a balanced sex composition of children in Western countries to get exogenous variation in fertility. Both studies find that parents with same-sex children are more likely to have additional children.
While they have to focus on the marginal effect of the third child, this study can estimate the marginal effect of the second child. But remember that my approach is not applicable to their samples. has a specific range of the desirable number of children.
The first panel shows all the possible paths of parity progression for the households that desire one child at least and two children at most (type-1 preferences). There are only three outcomes, B, GB, and GG. It is easy to show that the first child's sex is significantly correlated with the actual number of children that households end up with. By the assumption that parents prefer smaller number of children, those who had a boy (B)
at first should stop fertility, while those who had a girl (G) should go on. Assume that the probability of having a son is 0.51 and constant over parity, according to the demography literature. The expected number of children for those who had a girl (E(n|G)) is greater than the expected number of children for those who had a boy (E(n|B)). E(n|G) = 2 > 1 =
E(n|B).
Assuming that the entire population has type-1 preferences, the average number of children per household is 1.49, and the marginal effect of having a girl at first (First Girl ) on fertility is 1.
Now suppose that households prefer to have at least one child and can have three at maximum (type-2 preferences). There are four possibilities in parity progression, B, GB, GGG, and GGB. Parents who had a girl as their first child should end up with more children than those who had a boy because:
Again assuming that the population consists of only those with type-2 preferences, the average number of children per household is 1.73, and the marginal effect of having a first girl on fertility is 1.49. For those who prefer to have at least two and at most three children (type-3 preferences), it is also true that the event of First Girl increases the number of children:
In sum, First Girl has positive impacts on the number of children in the household regardless of different preferences for family size. It is also true when households prefer to have more than one son. For those who prefer two sons rather than one son (type-4 preferences), the first child's sex is still correlated with child quantity. Those who had a girl at first have 3 children, while those who had a boy have 2.49 on average.
The examples show that First Girl leads to larger sibling size under son preferences. The marginal effect would increase as more parents prefer sons, they have larger desired number of sons, and they are willing to accept more children. Comparing the outcomes of type-2 and type-3 preferences groups, we conclude that the marginal effect is larger as parents minimize the number of children (or small-size family becomes a social norm).
In sum, the results here show that our instrument should be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable (child quantity). It is competent to serve as an instrument for fertility and most likely to pass the chronic problem of "weak instrument" (Staiger and Stock 1995, Bound, Jaeger, and Baker. 1995).
Distinguishing Prenatal vs. Postnatal Son Preferences
Now we examine another requirement for consistent instrumental-variable estimation-the "validity" condition. This condition requires that instrumental variables should not directly affect the dependent variable of empirical interest (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000) . For this study, it means that the first child's sex should not directly affect parents' investment in children's education, but only does so indirectly through number of children.
Readers might suspect that investment in children's education should depend on the first child's sex, because the latter is correlated with the sex composition of children. Under son preferences, investment in children might depend on the sex composition. If parents prefer sons to daughters, they would invest more in their favored children.
It is, however, important to distinguish prenatal son preference from postnatal son preference. The first means that parents prefer to have sons rather than daughters, while the latter implies that they treat sons in more favorable ways. The fertility-stopping rule we examined is related to prenatal son preferences. What matters now for the validity condition There is another possibility that the instrumental-variable estimations could underestimate the true effect. As Hanushek (1992) pointed out, decreased child spacing acts like an increase in sibling size because smaller spacing means 1) lower probability of being in small family and 2) less attention and resources from parents. According to the demography literature, under son preferences, child spacing between the first and second child tends to decrease if the first child is a daughter, because parents would hurry to have another child to have a son. As a result, if we do not control for child spacing (also endogenous), we will underestimate the marginal effects in absolute term. This will strengthen my conclusion that the trade-off between child quantity and quality is not as strong as what observed cross-sectional relationships suggest.
Sex-Selective Abortion
We have shown that the first child's sex should satisfy both the relevance and validity conditions. One might be curious about why only the first child's sex can be a valid instrumental variable. For example, the sex composition of the first two children should predict number of children better than the first child's sex alone for those who have more than one child.
If parents had two daughters consecutively, they are more likely to have another child than those who had two sons or those who had a son and a daughter.
It is because of the existence of sex-selective abortion that we do not include the second child's sex as an additional instrumental variable. Sex-selective abortions are quite common in South Korea, in particular in 1990s including the sample period between 1993 and 1998. However, table 2 shows that the sex ratio gets imbalanced rapidly as the parity is higher.
The increases in the sex ratio over the birth order imply that parents not only prefer to have sons, but also prefer to have small number of children. Thus, female births after a certain number of children are suppressed by sex-selective abortions (Park and Cho 1995) .
It is surprising that the imbalance of the sex ratio has been recorded even at the birth order two since the mid-1980s. The second child's sex is not randomly assigned by nature, but chosen by parents. As a result, the second child's sex might be correlated with investment in education on the unobservable. Suppose that those who strongly prefer son and therefore are more likely to abort girls tend to invest more in children's education. If preferences for abortion are somehow related to preferences for child quality, the second child's sex cannot be a valid instrumental variable.
On the other hand, the sex ratio at the birth order one has remained around the normal level during the 1990s. Parents leave the sex of the first child to natural selection. The first child's sex is randomly assigned by nature and orthogonal to parents' preferences.
3 Empirical Analysis and Results
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study are the Korean Household Panel Study (KHPS 
Testing for the Existence of Son Preferences
There are various reasons for preferences for sons in South Korea. First, sons, in particular the eldest sons, are required to carry traditional family responsibilities, such as serving ancestor worship rites and supporting parents in their old ages. whether the household has more than one child or not). The key independent variable is the sex composition of children under a certain birth order. Table 4 shows the results. Marginal effects are calculated. In the first column, we find that having a girl as the first child increases the probability of having a second child (9.8 percent). In the second column, having two same-sex children increases the probability of having three or more children (9.9 percent).
This positive effect turns out to be entirely due to a large positive effect of having two girls (34.8 percent), when it is entered separately along with the indicator for having two boys in the third column. In fact, having two boys has a negative effect on fertility, implying that parents with two sons are more likely to stop childbearing compared to the reference group of parents of one boy and one girl. South Korean parents do not have preferences for a balanced sex mix of children, which Iacovou (1996) and Angrist and Evans (1998) are based on.
We can also test for the existence of son preferences by hazard models of fertility timing.
The hypothesis here is that, given the limited period of fertility, parents should advance the timing of the second birth after the first daughter than they do after the first son. By the same logic, they should try to have a third child sooner, if they had two daughters consecutively.
The dependent variable is now the time interval between births. An advantage of hazard models over parity progression models is that we do not have to restrict the sample.
I estimate Weibull hazard models, taking account of right-censoring of birth interval.
Only time-invariant variables, such as parents' education levels and mother's age at first birth, are included to avoid any bias that arises because explanatory variables change during the interval. Relative hazard ratios are calculated in table 5. As expected, having a girl as the first child significantly increases the hazard rate of having a second child by at least 48 percent. Any positive effect of Same Sex disappears once we include BB and GG separately, as with the results of parity progression model. The coefficient of BB is estimated less than one, which means that having two boys decreases the hazard rate of having a third child. This implies that parents are likely to delay additional childbearing-probably to delay for good-if they got two boys. On the other hand, GG significantly advances the third childbirth.
Marginal Effects of Fertility on Investment in Education
The purpose of this study is to estimate the causal effect of exogenous change in number of children on investment in children's education.
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Suppose that the government succeeds in suppressing population growth by some policies that do not directly affect household investment in children's education. It might tax childbirth or just legally forbid having more than a certain number of children, like China's one-child policy. The question is how the policy-induced changes in child quantity (fertility) affect child quality (investment in education).
First, we start with estimating a simple linear equation:
where
where the error term u 1 is assumed to be independent of all the control variables in X, such as mother's age, parents' years of schooling, natural logarithm of monthly total household income, indicator of living with grandparents, dummies for residential location, and four yearly dummies. Since educational costs differ by levels of schooling, we include average age of children and its square term, as suggested by Browning (1992).
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n represents the number of children in the household.
I represents monthly total investment in education for all children in the household.
Formally, I is equal to p q (n · q), where q is the average quality of children and p q is the unit price of child quality (Becker and Willis 1973) . By the Slutsky theorem and product rule, the coefficient α represents:
where qn represents the elasticity of child quality with respect to child quantity. It is therefore possible to recover the elasticity from the consistent estimate of α and the sample mean of n.
Equation (2) We also use the quadratic terms of mother's age interacted with First Girl as additional instruments. The rationale is that age profile of fertility would differ by the first child's sex, as the results from hazard models imply that those who had a daughter at first are likely to have more children at certain age than those who had a son. Lastly, we include the interaction of mother's education and First Girl because lower-educated mothers put greater importance on traditional values, including son preferences. We assume that, after being interacted with the first child's sex, mother's education does not affect total investment in children's education. Table 6 F -statistic for the instrument is 174.8, much larger than the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995). In column (4) the partial-R squared for multiple instruments is similar, and F -statistic is 38.7. The advantage of having multiple instruments is that we can test for the validity of instruments by testing over-identifying restrictions.
The results indicate that we cannot reject the validity of instruments (p-value for Hansen's J-statistic test is 0.53).
We relax the linearity of fertility in equation (1) if there are exactly three children and 0 otherwise. Recall that the maximum number of children is three in the sample. We estimate:
The coefficients, α 2 and α 3 , represent the marginal effects of the second and third child, respectively. If there were no trade-off, then we should have α 2 = 1 and α 3 = 2. Now that there are two endogenous explanatory variables, we must include at least two instrumental variables for identification. There are clearly different age profiles of fertility by the first child's sex. The age profiles implied by the estimates are depicted in figure 3 . The first graph shows the marginal effects of First Girl on the age profile of the probability of having exactly two children. The reference group is those with a son as the first child. The effects are graphed separately for three different education groups (middle-school graduates, high-school graduates, and college/university graduates). The age range for each educational group is chosen to guarantee that at least 10 observations are available at each age to avoid small-sample bias.
It is notable that the marginal effects are positive in the beginning and then decrease in age for all three groups. Positive signs are reasonable because having a girl as the first child would increase the likelihood of having a second child. Evaluated at the average age of the second childbirth for each group, the marginal effects are significantly positive. For middle-school graduates, the marginal effect is about 4 to 10 percent at age 26.6, while it is similarly 5 to 9 percent for high-school graduates at age 27.6. The average age of second childbirth is highest (29-30) for college/university graduates. The marginal effect evaluated at the average age is on the other hand lowest, 4 to 7 percent. Overall First Girl increases the probability of having two children by 4-10 percent. The age profiles are consistent with the fact that the higher educated women delay childbearing. And they prefer sons to daughters, but their preferences are weaker.
The figure also shows that the marginal effect is decreasing and becomes even negative, which seems unreasonable. However recall that we estimate the probability of having exactly two children. As a result, the marginal effect decreases as some of those who have a daughter at first fail to have a son again at the second attempt and now have a third child.
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In particular, for middle-school and high-school graduates, the marginal effects are significantly negative after certain ages (29 for middle-school and 30 for high-school graduates).
This suggests that, for these low-educated women, having a daughter at first increases the likelihood of having three or more children relatively, compared to the reference group of households who have a son as their first child.
The bottom graph in figure 3 shows the marginal effects of First Girl on the age profile of the probability of having exactly three children. The profile for college/university graduates is not drawn because there are few observations. This is not surprising in that few collegeeducated women have three children (total 35 observations). Contrary to the previous graph, the marginal effects increase in age. The increasing profiles indicate that having a third child happens later in age. For middle-school graduates, First Girl increases the probability of having three children by 9 to 11 percent at the age 28.6, which is the average age when those women have a third child. The corresponding effect is 7 to 8 percent for high-school graduates at their average age 29.9. The results confirm that the higher-educated women postpone childbearing and they have weaker preferences for sons.
Some results in column (4) in table 7 are worth noting. First, investment in children's education is a normal good, and the income elasticity is quite inelastic, about 0.4. It confirms that children's education is a priority in household expenditure. Those who live in metropolitan areas, especially in the capital Seoul, invest significantly more in children, while they have smaller number of children. Those in metropolitan areas invest more by about 5 percent, and those living in Seoul invest additionally more by 8 to 9 percent. This might reflect stronger preferences for child quality in these regions or more investment opportunities in cities, such as private tutoring and academic institutes. Not surprisingly, the higher-educated parents tend to invest more in children's education. Investment is more responsive to mother's education rather than father's education, which is consistent with the notion that child quality depends more on the mother-side characteristics. The higher-education mothers have smaller number of children, but they invest more in children's education. On the other hand, father's education also increases investment, while it tends to increase number of children.
4 Summary
This study examines the effects of fertility on parental investment in children's education to test for the existence of trade-off between child quantity and quality. The main contribution is that this study exploits exogenous variation in fertility due to son preferences to identify the causal effects of child quantity on quality. A consistent estimate of the effect of fertility on total investment in children's education is important for policy makers in developing countries. It is important to know the extent to which population policy aiming at lowering fertility rate is effective in fostering human capital investment in future labor force.
The results for South Korean households suggest that the endogeneity of fertility plays a significant role in the observed inverse relationship between child quantity and quality.
The observed trade-off exaggerates the true relationship. However, there still exists the trade-off in a significant way. Furthermore, as number of children increases, the trade- There must exist other factors that decrease fertility rate and, at the same time, increase investment in education-for example, increasing parental concern about children's education or increases in the returns to human capital associated with technical changes. 26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35 Middle-School Graduates High-School Graduates
